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Abstract
I study the slow adoption of ring-spinning in Great Britains cotton industry at the end of
the 19th century, which has been used as evidence of British entrepreneursdeclining e¢ ciency
and conservatism (Musson [1959], Aldcroft, [1964], Lazonick [1981, 1981b]). To this purpose I
use rm-level data from all of Lancashires cotton rms over several years. The data are from
the Worralls Cotton Spinnersand ManufacturersDirectories for the years 1885, 1886-1887,
1890, 1894, 1902, and 1910.
First, I show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its rms specializing in spin-
ning or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring-spinning technology,
as was argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated rms were
the rst to adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of rms that adopted rings were
incumbents; iii) vertically integrated rms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were
still in existence in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of rms changed their organizational
structure upon adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large fraction of rms installed very
small numbers of ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that rms were
slowly adopting ring spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring
spinning at a single point in time.
Then, I show that the rate at which vertically integrated rms adopted rings suddenly accel-
erated after 1902. I interpret this as evidence that British entrepreneurs were fully aware of the
technological complementarities between rings and automatic looms. These complementarities
could only be fully exploited by vertically integrated rms.
Keywords: Ring Spinning, Technology Adoption, Cotton Industry, Lancashire, Vertical In-
tegration, Specialization.
JEL Codes: N63, L22, L67.
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1 Introduction
For decades, historians have been concerned with explaining the decline of Great Britain as the
economic world leader after 1870. By the end of the 1890s, Britain had lost the industrial leadership
of the world to Germany and the United States (McCloskey and Sandberg [1971]). In an inuential
paper, Aldcroft [1964] argued that Britains poor economic performance can be attributed largely
to the failure of the British entrepreneur to respond to the challenge of changed condition. [...]
The failure to adopt new techniques, that is new machinery and other cost-reducing innovations
[...] was one of the chief reasons [...] for the decline in the rate of growth of the British economy.1
This paper investigates whether the decline of Great Britain can be explained, at least in part,
by the ineptitude of its entrepreneurs, as was argued by Aldcroft. To address this question, I look
at one industrial case that has been at the center of a highly charged and often heated exchange
spread out over a number of rounds and spanning several decades: the slow adoption by the
British entrepreneurs of ring-spinning in yarn production. The main reason why the adoption of
ring-spinning has received so much attention is because the British cotton industry was the most
important export industry in Britain throughout the 19th century.
Since the mid 1880s, the new technique of ring-spinning had become economically viable in
yarn production.2 The production of yarn was faster with ring-spinning than with mule-spinning.
Furthermore, labor costs were lower. Ring-spinning was more e¢ cient than mule-spinning: per unit
of time, ring-spinning resulted in higher production at a lower labor costs. If British entrepreneurs
1Aldcroft [1964], p. 113 and p. 115. For a critical analysis of the full damning catalogue of the British
entrepeneurs reasons of failure, see McCloskey and Sandberg [1971].
2Leunig [1996, 2001] provides a review of the cotton manufacturing process and of the di¤erences between ring
and mule spinning. He also provides a comprehensive review of the literature. Here, I present the key insights of the
debate on the adoption of rings in Great Britain at the end of the 19th century.
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had been prot maximizers, the indictment reads, they should have started adopting ring-spinning
as soon as the early 1880s, when it became economically viable. Until 1910, however, mule-spinning
continued to be heavily preferred to ring-spinning. For this reason, the slow adoption of ring-
spinning has been used as evidence of British entrepreneursdeclining e¢ ciency and conservatism
(Musson [1959]).
Sandberg [1969] challenged the interpretation of the slow adoption of ring spinning as evidence
of the ineptitude of the British entrepreneurs. He calculated the cost and benets of mule versus
ring-spinning, and concluded that the choice of production technique was rational. Lancashire
cotton rms were adopting rings for the production of the coarser types of cotton yarn for which
the ring was superior to the mule.
Lazonick [1981, 1981b] revived the hypothesis that Lancashire cotton rms were managed by
inept entrepreneurs. Lazonick conrmed Sandbergs conclusions that Lancashire businessmen
performed admirably as neoclassical managers, but he also advanced the hypothesis that they
failed as entrepreneurs.3 Lazonick showed that entrepreneurial failure was systematic across the
cotton industry, and did not only involve scattered cases of entrepreneurial success or failure.4
The central tenet of Lazonicks argument was the following. In the last quarter of the 19th century,
most of the Lancashire cotton rms were either spinning cotton or weaving yarn. Some vertically
integrated rms were both spinning and weaving on the same site. Lazonick argued that the cost
of shipping ring yarn was signicantly higher for non-integrated rms than it was for integrated
rms, while the di¤erence was inconsequential for mule yarn. Rings spun the yarn on a heavy
3Lazonick [1981b], p. 37.
4McCloskey and Sandberg [1971], p. 99.
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wooden bobbin that needed to be rewound, while mules spun yarn on small and light packages
ready to be woven. For some type of yarn, the di¤erence of the transportation costs was so large
that a non-integrated rm would have never found it protable to adopt ring spinning. Lancashire
businessmen should have then vertically integrated but did not, failing to recognize that managers
from time to time (as innovating entrepreneurs), overcome givenconstraints and on a more regular
basis (as supervisors of the enterprise) alter givenconstraints.5 The constraint that Lancashire
cotton rms did not overcome was the vertical organization of cotton production.6
Saxonhouse and Wright [1984] challenged Lazonicks claim that the Lancashire cotton rms did
not adopt rings because of the vertical organization of the industry. First, they used data from
the records of British textile machinery companies to show that the Lancashire cotton rms did
not adopt an innovation (paper-tubes) that would have reduced the transportation costs associated
with ring spinning.7 They inferred that transportation costs had to be lower than what Lazonick
computed, because otherwise the British rms would have adopted the innovation.8 Second, they
used the same records of British textile machinery companies to develop a cross-country comparison
5Lazonick [1981], p. 90.
6See Lazonick, pp. 396-397 [1984] for more on this. Temin [1988, page 906] has argued that the ease of access
to capital made the formation of integrated concerns easier in North America. Following Temins argument, this is
equivalent to saying that if in Lancashire there had been easy access to capital, cotton rms would have chosen vertical
integration over specialization. However, information at the rm-level shows that many rms were sharing power,
plants, and possibly power-looms. As Gatrell [1977, page 105] wrote, in the 1820s and 1830s, credit was available to
all producers in these years: by 1835, it was claimed that mostnew rms were being set up on borrowings of up
to two-thirds of the value of buildings and machinery combined.
7Saxonhouse and Wright use the data from the records of British textile machinery companies to also conrm
one of Lazonicks nding, which is that British cotton spinners maintained their commitment to the mule in new
installations until World War I.
8 In his reply to Saxonhouse and Wright, Lazonick [1987] made a useful distinction between twist and weft yarn,
which Saxonhouse and Wright essentially accepted: paper tubes would have ensured lower transportation costs only
for twist (warp) yarn, not for weft yarn. Thus, Saxonhouse and Wrights main point remained valid as far as warp yarn
was concerned: Lancashire cotton rms did not adopt it to as great of an extent as they should have if transportation
costs were as important as Lazonick had claimed in his previous work.
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between Britain, New England, and Japan.9 On one hand, they pointed out that New England had
a vertically integrated cotton industry but never attained international competitiveness.10 On the
other hand, they highlighted the case of the Japanese cotton industry, which rapidly captured the
world markets in the 1920s and 1930s while switching from mules to rings, but never wove more
than 30 percent of its yarn on a vertically integrated basis.11 Using this stark contrast between the
British, Japanese and New England experiences, Saxonhouse and Wright concluded that vertical
specialization was not, per se, an obstacle to ring adoption.
In recent work, Leunig [1996, 2001] further investigated the di¤erences in transportation costs
associated with ring and mule spinning. Leunig broke down the distribution of spinners and weavers
in Lancashire and assessed how much yarn was spun and woven in each district. He constructed
proxies for yarn output and weaving capacity, and identied these districts where weaving capacity
exceeded total spinning output. He called these the co-locateddistricts. All spinners in a co-
locateddistrict could have sold all of their yarn to weavers within their districts. The critical point
made by Leunig is that non-integrated rms in co-locateddistricts could escape the problem of
9Saxonhouse and Wright [2009] further investigate the evolution of ring spinning at global, national and rm
levels, and track adoption decisions in a large number of countries over a span of more than fty years. The result of
their investigation is a case study in global competition between contending technological paradigms.
10See Leunig [2003] for an analysis of productivity in the Lancashire and New England cotton spinning industries
at the beginning of the 20th century.
11Lazonick addressed this second point made by Saxonhouse and Wright in a paper with Mass (Mass and Lazonick
[1990]). Lazonick and Mass claimed that the explanation of Japans success was in its planned co-ordination,which
dominated the market co-ordinationof the Lancashire industry. That is, spinning-only rms as well as merchants
(or trading companies) co-ordinated the vertical structure of the industry so that even though they never wove more
than 30 percent of its yarn (mostly for the export trade) on a vertically integrated basis, it still acted as if it was
fully vertically integrated. The crucial question here is, how do we measure the extent of vertical co-ordination?
More specically, how can we determine in some quantiable fashion whether the Japanese cotton industry was
more vertically co-ordinatedthan the British one? In contrast to the original article by Lazonick [1984], Mass and
Lazonick [1990] does not provide a sharp and denitive testable hypothesis, just an interesting perspective on the
di¤erences between the Japanese and the British cotton industries at the beginning of the 20th century. For more
on this, and for a more detailed discussion of the role of merchants as co-ordinating agents in the Lancashire cotton
industry, see Broadberry and Marrison [2002] and Farnie [2004].
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transport costs. Hence, by contrasting the ring adoption patterns of integrated and non-integrated
rms in co-located districts, Leunig tested whether the vertical organization of a rm acted as
a constraint in the adoption of rings. Leunig found that rings were the clear majority choice
for both vertically integrated and co-located rms, whereas mules were the clear majority choice
for vertically isolated rms. Leunig also concluded that vertical specialization was not per se an
obstacle to ring adoption.
A fundamental unifying feature of the works by Sandberg, Lazonick, Saxonhouse and Wright,
and Leunig is that they all use aggregate data to investigate a fundamentally rm-level issue, the
adoption of ring-spinning. To be able to infer something about rm behavior from aggregate data,
these authors used very clever arguments. Here, I take a di¤erent approach. Instead of relying on
some very sophisticated deductive arguments, I let the data speak.
The main contribution of this paper is to use rm-level data from the entire population of Lan-
cashire cotton rms over several years to investigate the organizational and technological choices of
the cotton rms in Lancashire. The data are from the Worralls Cotton Spinnersand Manufactur-
ersDirectories for 1885, 1887, 1890, 1894, 1902, and 1910.12 In practice, I collected and organized
data for thousands of rms, and classied them as spinner-only, weaver-only, or vertically integrated
rms. This makes it possible to directly test arguments that Lazonick used to claim that British
entrepreneurs failed as entrepreneurs. I also match information from the Worralls Directories with
maps of Preston and Blackburn extracted from the Ordnance Survey, 1891-92. This allows me to
12Lazonick [1981] used the same data source for 1907 and 1910, but mainly at an aggregate level. The only rm-level
information that Lazonick uses from the Worralls directory concerns the 2100 ring spindles in all of Lancashire that
spun weft in a non-integrated mill (Lazonick [1981], p. 98). Leunig [1996, 2001] uses data from Worralls Directory
in 1905 to argue that the adoption rates of rings to spin weft yarn were not di¤erent between vertically integrated
and non-integrated rms.
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check Leunigs theory of co-location using rm-level data.
First, I show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its rms specializing in spinning
or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring-spinning technology, as was
argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated rms were the rst to
adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of rms that adopted rings were incumbents; iii)
vertically integrated rms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were still in existence
in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of rms changed their organizational structure upon
adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large fraction of rms installed very small numbers of
ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that rms were slowly adopting ring
spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring spinning at a single
point in time.
Then, I show that the rate at which vertically integrated rms adopted rings suddenly accel-
erated after 1902. This is a novel and striking nding that had not been uncovered till now. I
interpret this nding as evidence that British entrepreneurs were fully aware of the technological
complementarities between rings and automatic looms. These complementarities could only be
fully exploited by vertically integrated rms.
The paper is organized as follows. I provide a description of the cotton manufacturing process
in Section (2). The new dataset is briey described in Section (3). Section (4) investigates how the
deductive arguments used by Sandberg, Lazonick, Saxonhouse and Wright, and Leunig fare when
rm-level data is used. Section (5) proposes an explanation for why vertically integrated rms
started adopting rings only after 1902. Section (6) concludes.
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2 A Brief Introduction to the Production of Cotton
Cotton Spinning and Weaving. The production of cotton can be summarized in four successive
steps: cleaning the raw cotton;13 spinning, or transforming the cleaned raw cotton into yarn;
weavingthe yarn into cotton cloth; and the nishing operations, such as bleaching, dyeing
and printing. In this paper I focus on the spinning and weaving processes.14 The basic function
of the spinning process is to bind the laments together into one strand by means of twisting it, and
ensure that the resulting yarn resists the strain which it will have to undergo when woven. After
being twisted, the yarn is wound into a package to be shipped to weavers. These two sub-processes,
twisting and winding, can either be done continuously (using rings) or intermittently (using mules).
Weaving consists of combining two sets of threads, one of which is immobile (the warp or twist),
and the other which moves normally to the rst and lls it (the weft).15
Technological Progress. There are three technological periods for weaving. First, between 1800
and 1830, the hand-loom was used to produce all cloths. Often, spinning was done in factories,
while weaving was either outsourced to households, or done in sheds attached to the factory. By
1830, the power-loom was perfected and could be used to weave coarse and medium cloth. Cloths
13Cleaning consists of loosening the mass of bers that form the original status of the raw cotton into a clean set
of individual bres parallel to each other. This is done by passing the raw cotton through rollers, and this operation
is called carding. If the cotton is of a ne quality, an additional operation, called combing, is performed on
it, to remove bers that are too short and ensure a parallel position for the remaining ones. Finally, the bers are
combined together (drawingand roving) and attenuated so that the resulting laments are uniform in thickness
before going through the subsequent spinning process.
14During the cleaning process some of the cotton is wasted. Some of this waste is lost, but some is recovered through
the condenser system. Because the nal product which is obtained from the condenser system is very special and
di¤erent from the product obtained from the standard processes of spinning and weaving, it is not considered here.
See Robson [1957] for more on this.
15The result of spinning was either warp or weft yarn. The rst had to be stronger than the second, since it will
serve as the frame of the cloth, while the weft will be used to ll the twist to form the cloth. Weft would use cotton
that is 7 percent shorter than that needed for ring warp (Leunig [1996]).
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that used yarn of counts of up to 60 could be woven in 1841 with power looms. Between 1850 and
the 1880s, the power-loom was extended to the production of ne cloth. In 1894 the automatic
loom was invented in the US, but it was adopted very slowly in Britain.
There are two technological periods in spinning. The rst period goes from 1820 until the early
1880s. In these years, the self-acting mule was used by all spinners. Then in the early 1880s, the
ring-frame was perfected for spinning coarse and medium cloths and was slowly adopted by British
entrepreneurs.
Fineness. Cotton yarn is normally classied as coarse, medium, or ne. The unit of measure of
neness is the hank. A hank of cotton yarn or twist always measure 840 yards. If the count
of 1 is reported, this means that one hank of cotton yarn weighs one pound. If the count of 40
is reported, this means that forty hanks of cotton weigh one pound.16 The more hanks that are
needed to make one pound, the ner the yarn is. Thus, a count of 120 means that the yarn is very
ne, a count of 40 means that the yarn is of medium neness, and a count of 2 means that the yarn
is very coarse.
Ring versus Mule Spinning. Ring-spinning subjected cotton to more strain: for any given
count, mule spinning could use raw cotton of lesser quality relative to what ring-spinning could
use. Ring spinning required a longer cotton staple and, since the price of cotton increased with
length, the raw input was potentially more costly under ring-spinning. Leunig calculates the cost
di¤erentials of raw cotton between ring and mule spinning.17 He convincingly shows that the
16Ure [1831], Appendix A, page 335.
17Leunig [1996], p. 66. Leunigs ndings do not support Lazonicks, [1981. p. 103] assumption on the cost
di¤erentials between mules and rings.
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premium started slightly in the range of counts 20 to 30 and increased with count spun.18
Rings required unskilled or semiskilled female labor, while mule spinning used highly skilled
male labor. Furthermore, ring-spinning was faster. In the same amount of time, one ring spindle
could produce 1:45 times more than one mule spindle.19 Sandberg, Lazonick and Leunig concluded
that, as far as labor costs were concerned, ring-spinning was cheaper than mule spinning for all
counts. Leunig showed that labor cost savings increased in the count spun.20
Mule weft yarn was wound into packages that were lighter than the wooden bobbin needed for
ring weft yarn. Sandberg showed that ring spinning increased the transportation costs of weft yarn
by 200 percent. Lazonick showed that it cost as much to return bobbins as to send them, and that
there was always the possibility that some or all of the bobbins would be lost or broken. The extra
cost per pound of shipping ring weft would then rise by 500 percent. Transportation costs for twist
yarn varied much less: Leunig nds the transport cost of shipping ring twist yarn to be larger by
a value between 24 percent and 100 percent.21
Vertical Organization of the Industry. There were four types of rms in the industry. Each
type of rm could own more than one plant.
The rst two types were rms that specialized in either spinning or weaving. For example, the
rm E. & W. Bolling owned four plants in Bolton in 1833, and the four of them were dedicated
only to spinning. These were vertically specialized rms, or spinning-only or weaving-only rms.
Then there were rms that were vertically integrated in a strict sense: they were spinning and
18Normally weft yarn is of higher count than twist yarn. For example shirtings were produced with twist counts in
the 20s and weft counts in the 30s (Cotton Manufactures, Report of the Tari¤ Board on Schedule I of the Tari¤ Law,
House of Representatives, Washington, 1912).
19Leunig [2001].
20Leunig [1996], p. 66.
21Leunig [2001].
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weaving in the same building. For example, in 1833 the rm Birley and Kirk owned a rm in
Manchester where 931 spinners and 471 weavers worked. These were vertically integrated rms.
Finally, there were rms that were vertically integrated in a loose sense: they were both spinning
and weaving but in two di¤erent plants. For example, the rm Hadeld and Frost owned two plants
in Warrington in 1833: one plant had 143 spinners while the other plant had 192 weavers. These
were vertically combined rms.22
There is a rich literature on the advantages and disadvantages of specialization in the produc-
tion of cotton. On one hand, Farnie [1979, page 319] has argued that by compartmentalizing
technical knowledge, vertical specialization accentuated the vertical ignorance of both spinners
and manufacturers, [...] it insulated spinners from the ultimate market for woven goods, hindered
them from producing the yarns best suited to specic types of cloth.Similarly, using data from the
1841 Inspector Horners Factory Reports, Gatrell [1977] argues that if there were advantages for
the rms that were spinning and weaving, then these advantages were not derived from their larger
size in and of itself, but from internal economies in the costs otherwise incurred in selling, buying,
and transporting yarns.On the other hand, Jewkes [1930, page 96] argued that specialization gave
rms the ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the market and the scale of production:
[...] the multiplicity of nished products and the di¤erent technique demanded for maximum ef-
ciency in spinning and weaving rms [forced] the separation in the ownership and control of the
two processes. Also, Huberman [1990] has argued that after 1850, new rms tended to special-
ize in spinning or weaving because large integrated rms faced a managerial constraint [because
22The distinction between vertically integrated and combined rms is particularly interesting: it should provide in-
formation on whether the di¤erences between vertically specialized rms and those that were not vertically specialized
were at the plant or the rm level. Ill return to this in Section (4.1).
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they were] unable to monitor and supervise their work forces e¤ectively.23 Saxonhouse and Wright
[1984, page 518] also claimed that the newer rms and mills were specialized and, in conjunction
with highly developed markets and marketing facilities, [...] were able to exploit distinct managerial
talents and abilities as well as economies of long production runs for standard counts of yarn. In
this paper, I stay away from determining which of those advantages and disadvantages dominated,
and I only look at the ring adoption behavior of the two organizational forms.
3 Data
The data are from the Worralls Cotton Spinnersand ManufacturersDirectories of 1885, 1886-7,
1890, 1893-4, 1902 and 1910. These data contain information on the names of the rms, locations,
and types of spindle used by cotton rms in Lancashire. They also contain information on the
number of spindles (and looms) used by each rm, the neness of the product manufactured and
whether the rm spun both twist and weft yarn.
An important step in the coding of the data consists of determining the neness of cloth. To this
end, I have followed two approaches, compared their results, and then checked their consistency
against each other. First I have used the Cotton Manufactures: Report of the Tari¤ Board on
Schedule I of the Tari¤ Law, Message from the President of the United States, Washington, 1912.
The report presents a section that associates the range of counts for yarn to the type of cloth
produced: for example, Heavy Sheeting is produced with twist yarn of count 12, and with weft
yarn of count 16. Another example is Shirting, which is produced with twist yarn of count 28 and
weft yarn of count in the 30s. This classication does not cover all the types of clothes. When a
23Huberman [1990], page 683.
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type of cloth is not included, I look for a rm that also produces another type of cloth that is in the
book and infer the classication for the one that is not in the book. Then I used the information
from the Worralls Directories. I reasonably assumed that rms producing both yarn and cloth will
choose a range of counts for yarn that can be used by their weavers to produce cloth. I have done
a consistency check between the two methods and the results are perfectly consistent. The results
are presented in the Table 1.24
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for the cotton rms in Lancashire in 1890. The rst
row gives the percentage of industry output by rm type in 1890. Spinner-only rms owned 64:4
percent of the total spindleage in 1890.25 In 1902, the spinner-only rms controlled 71:0 percent of
the spindle capacity. By 1910, they controlled 78:8 percent. Notice that this number is the same
as the one reported by Lazonick.26 Thus, spinner-only rms increased their spinning capacity over
time.
The last rows of Table 2 show that the number of spinner-only rms increased between 1890
and 1910, while the number of vertically integrated rms declined.
Just by looking at Table 2, it is already di¢ cult to reconcile the dramatic increase in the number
of spinner-only rms, and in their capacity of spindles, with the idea that vertical integration was
24 In practice, to classify the product I have proceeded as follows. I have identied ve classications: very coarse
(1), coarse/medium (12), medium (2), medium/ne (23), ne (3).If a rm reports that it spins yarn of
count between 0 and 20, then the rm is assigned a 1. If the rm reports a twist count between 20 and 40, then
the rm is assigned a 2. If the rms reports a twist count above 40, then I assign the rm a 3. I include the
upper extreme in the lower interval. For example, a count of 40 corresponds to 2. I then apply the classication
to weft yarn, and assign a 1 for 0-30, a 2 for 30-50 and a 3 for counts above 50. In some cases there may be
uncertainty because weft and twist are in di¤erent sections. When this occurs, I follow a conservative approach, and
use the twist. Often rms produce counts that are between regions. For example, they may choose to produce yarn
of count 10/30. In this case I assign the rm a count equal to 12. If a rm has very few spindles or few looms,
then I take a conservative approach, and if the rm gives a very large range of counts (say 10/30), then I assign it in
the lower region (1).
25My numbers are unadjusted for di¤erences in speed between rings and mules.
26Lazonick, [1984] p. 394.
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the most e¢ cient way to manufacture cotton. It would have taken a truly impressive degree of
ineptitude on the part of the British entrepreneurs to justify these patterns in the data.
4 Did British Entrepreneurs Fail?
In this Section, I rst provide new evidence on the importance of transportation costs in the cotton
industry. Then I check, one by one, all of the deductive arguments used by Lazonick, and see if
there are fallacies with them that can be uncovered by the rm-level data.
4.1 Transportation Costs
As discussed in the introduction, the crucial insight of Lazonicks analysis is that the transportation
costs of shipping ring yarn were signicantly larger than those of shipping mule yarn, and thus
British entrepreneurs should have vertically integrated in order to escape the higher transportation
costs of shipping ring yarn. Table 3 shows the conclusions that can be drawn from the new
calculations made by Leunig for labor and raw cotton costs, and the calculations made by Lazonick
for transportation costs. The rst row of Table 3 shows that vertically integrated rms, which
could escape transportation costs, should have chosen rings to produce weft and twist yarn of counts
lower than 40. The second row of Table 3 shows that non-integrated rms should have chosen
rings to produce twist yarn of counts lower than 40, but should have never chosen rings to produce
weft yarn.
The best place to begin the empirical analysis is to look more carefully at some evidence on
the actual magnitude of transportation costs. In abstract, the transportation costs could be quite
large, as Sandberg, Lazonick, and Leunig showed in their detailed analysis. The relevant issue
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here is whether, in practice, the costs were actually so large. As Leunig observed, if rms were
geographically close to each other then, in practice, transportation costs would be negligible. Using
aggregate data, Leunig identied co-located districts, where weaving capacity exceeded total
spinning output. Here, I take another step in this direction.
Evidence from the Ordnance Survey. I match the information from the Worralls Cotton
Spinners and Manufacturers Directory of 1890 with historical maps published as part of the
Ordnance Survey conducted in 1891 and 1892 in Great Britain. I look at the distribution of cotton
mills in the centre of two towns, Blackburn and Preston. For both of them I identify whether a
cotton mill corresponds to a weaver, a spinner, or an integrated rm. Then, I identify whether the
spinners or the vertically integrated rms produce both weft and twist yarn, or just one of the two.
Figure 1 looks at the case of Blackburn. We observe that rms were locating their plants (mills)
close to each other and to the canal. Eanam Bridge Mill was a spinning rm, producing only weft
yarns. In the adjacent building, Rose Hill Mill was an integrated rm and produced both twist and
weft yarn. In the building in front, the Wharf Street Mill housed a weaver. Clearly, spinning and
weaving plants were located very closely together, suggesting that the transportation costs would
have been negligible.
Figure 2 shows that Blackburn was not an exception. We can count as many as ten mills in the
centre of Preston. The survey shows that in Preston the vertically integrated rm Goodair John &
Co. owned the Brookeld Mill and the Peel Mill. Goodair John & Co. spun only weft yarn. In the
building in front of the Brookeld Mill sat the Southgate Mill, owned by the vertically integrated
rm Smith Joseph. Smith Joseph spun both twist and weft yarn. Within a short distance, there
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were four weavers-only, one spinner-only and another vertically integrated rm. Nothing in the
data indicates whether these nine rms were in a business relationship, but vertically integrated
rms were located in a district with several rms that were all closely located.
Both Figures 1 and 2 tell the same tale. Firms of all types (spinners, weavers, and vertically
integrated) were all located near each other. Ideally, one could construct maps for all districts and
all rms, and could even compute the distances between mills as a measure of transportation costs.
Yet the main nding would remain the same: while transportation costs were potentially large, in
practice they were most likely negligible.
Firms and Plants. Another approach to show that transportation costs had to be negligible con-
sists of looking for counter-examples. I look for vertically integrated rms that do not manufacture
both weft and twist in-house. This would provide evidence that even vertically integrated rms
were willing to pay the transportation costs. The driving idea is to use the distinction between
plant and rm. This distinction is important here because rms often shared the same plant (here
meant as a physical bulding), or one rm controlled more than one plant.27
The new rm-level data clarify that rms that both wove and spun might very well have been
doing those two things at di¤erent plants. For example, in 1890 the rm Taylor D. & W. located
in Blackburn owned 111; 800 spindles and 2; 152 looms. The rm distributed its production among
six mills. Figure 1 shows that at least one of them, the Bridge Water Mill, was not close to any
of the other ve mills owned by the rm. The closest mills to the Bridge Water Mill were owned
by two weaver-only rms. We do not know whether the Bridge Water Mill both spun and wove or
27See Mokyr [2001] for a discussion on the distinction between rms and mills and for a more general analysis of
the rise and fall of the factory system.
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did only one of the two.28
In only a few exceptions is information available on how rms distributed their productions across
plants. These exceptions can be used as a counter-example to Lazonicks claim that entrepreneurs
should have vertically integrated in order to escape the higher transportation costs of shipping
ring yarn. In the Worralls Cotton Spinnersand ManufacturersDirectory published in 1902, the
rm Halliday & Constantine owned the Dicconson Mill at Wigan where it only spun (using ring
spindles) and the Upper Mills in Golborne, where it only wove. This rm was denitively not
vertically integrated. Another counter-example was given by the rm Hadeld and Frost, which
owned two plants in Warrington in 1833: one plant had 143 spinners while the other plant had
192 weavers. One could also construct numerous counter-examples by showing the large amount
of heterogeneity in the ratio of spindles to looms at vertically integrated rms, which suggests that
these rms did outsource some of the weaving or spinning to specialized rms.29
It is inappropriate to generalize from a few rms to the entire industry, but it is clear that the
unit of observation should be the plant (mill) rather than the rm. If the distinction between plants
and rms is introduced, then even what Lazonick classied as vertically integrated rms could have
spun and woven at di¤erent plants, facing the same transportation costs as the specialized rms.
28The Worralls directory rarely provides information on how the total spinning and weaving capacity is divided
among the mills of one rm.
29 In 1890 the average ratio across all the vertically integrated rms was 55.9 spindles per loom; the standard
deviation was equal to 42.2, the maximum was 408.9; and the mimimum was equal to 2.2. One might argue that
the heterogeneity in the type of cloth being produced would lead to heterogeneity in this ratio. In particular, if you
are producing coarse cloth you need far fewer spindles per loom than if you are producing ne yarn. To check this
possibility, I recomputed the average number of spindles per loom only for the producers of ner goods. I found
the average ratio to be equal to 58.1 and the standard deviation equal to 52.0. Thus, heterogeneity in the ratio of
spindles to looms is not driven by the neness of the cloth produced.
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4.2 The Adoption of Ring Spinning over Time and Across Types of Firms
Table 4.a lists the rms that reported the use of ring-spinning in 1887, 1890 and 1894.30 I also use
data from 1885 and 1887 to show whether rms changed their vertical structure by the time they
had adopted ring spinning in 1887. The rms reported in Table 4.a are the early adopters of rings
in the Lancashire cotton industry. The table reports whether the rm was a spinner-only (S), a
weaver-only (W ) or vertically integrated (V I). I also report the name of the rm (abbreviated),
the district where the rm was located, and the number of ring spindles that were owned by the
rm in each of those ve years. The rm might also report mule spindles but for sake of simplicity
they are not reported in the table. If the rm reports the number of spindles but does not say
how many of them are rings vs how many are mules, then the number of spindles is reported in
brackets. Table 4.b lists the rms that reported the use of ring-spinning in 1902, and is organized
in the same fashion as Table 4.a. Table 4.c lists the rms that reported the use of ring-spinning
in 1910, but, for sake of brevity, does not report the number of ring spindles that they owned.31
Column 1 of Table 5 shows the total cumulative number of rms that adopted rings over
time. In 1887, only 9 rms reported that they had adopted ring-spinning, 3 of which were newly
formed rms relative to 1885. Of the other 6 rms, we know that the rm Bury Cotton Spinning
and Manufacturing Co. (located in the district of Bury) had been in the industry since 1840;
Heywood Cotton Spinning and Manufacturing Co. (in Heywood) since 1860;32 New Lady House
Cotton Spinning Co. (in Rochdale) since 1877. Seven of these nine rms were still present in 1910,
30See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion on the collection of the data used in Tables 4a, 4b, 4c.
31This information is available from the author. It is used to construct Figure 3.
32Notwitshanding its name (manufacturing usually means that the rm also weaves its yarn), this rm was a
spinner-only in all of the Worralls directories that I used. My guess is that this rm had originally been vertically
integrated and then did not change its name when it discontinued its weaving operations.
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suggesting that they thrived after the adoption of ring-spinning.
25 rms had adopted rings by 1890. This was still a small number relative to the almost one
thousand rms that were spinning yarn in Lancashire. 58 rms had adopted rings by 1894. By 1902,
the number of rms that had adopted rings was already 109, around 10 percent of the total number
of rms in the industry. 330 rms, or approximately one third of the spinning rms in Lancashire,
had adopted rings by 1910. Some remarkable ones, which adopted rings more than twenty years
after this technology rst became available, are the vertically integrated rm Bury & H.(located
in the Bury district), which had been in the industry since 1840, and the vertically integrated rm
Ashton (in Hyde), which had been in the industry since 1780. These were presumably very well
managed vertically integrated rms and yet they did not adopt rings as soon as they could have
done.
Finally, Tables 4.a, 4.b, and 4.c show that the districts of Manchester, Oldham, and Rochdale
contained the largest number of rms that had adopted rings by 1902. By 1910, most of the districts
had rms that had adopted rings.
We can now check whether the rst of Lazonicks deductive arguments withstands the test of the
new rm-level data. Lazonick claimed that British entrepreneurs should have vertically integrated
in order to escape the higher transportation costs of shipping ring yarn. One of his arguments
was that ring spindles were installed disproportionately in integrated mills, 46 percent of all ring
spindles being in these mills in 1913.33 That is, Britain would have adopted rings much more
quickly if more rms had been vertically integrated.
Column 2 of Table 5 reports the number of spinners-only that had adopted rings. By 1887,
33Lazonick [1981], page 98.
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eight out of nine rms reporting ring spindles were non-integrated. By 1890, 23 out of 25 were
non-integrated. By 1902, only around 20 percent of the adopters were vertically integrated rms.
One novel and striking nding is that during the period between 1902 and 1910 vertically
integrated rms started adopting ring-spinning in a systematic fashion. Of the 221 rms that
adopted rings between 1902 and 1910, 50 percent of them were vertically integrated. In 1910
the vertically integrated rms controlled 40 percent of the ring spindles in Lancashire, which is a
percentage very close to the 46 percent found by Lazonick for 1913. Thus, Lazonick did not get the
numbers wrong in 1913. What he got wrong was the projection back in time for the earlier years
when, contrary to his conclusions, the non-integrated rms were the rst to adopt rings. Only after
1902, during the last period of expansion of the Lancashire cotton industry, did vertically integrated
rms start to adopt ring-spinning. If integration had anything to do with failure, it would have
been seen in the data since the very beginning. It did not.
The second of Lazonicks arguments was that the British continued to use new mules to replace
retired mules, rather than adopting rings. To support this conjecture, Lazonick claimed that a
large proportion of the increase in ring spindles consisted of ring-frames installed in new mills or
extensions of old mills, and hence did not replace retired mules.34
Column 3 of Table 5 shows that until 1902 almost all of the rms that adopted rings were
incumbents in the industry. Most of these rms, already in the industry, were adopting rings to
replace old mules or to expand their production. After 1902, many new rms adopted rings as well.
This is understandable: the rst decade of the twentieth century was a period of great expansion
for the Lancashire cotton industry, and it is natural that new entrants would also adopt rings.
34Lazonick [1981], page 96.
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However, the key observation here is that the large majority of rms that adopted rings by 1910
were incumbents. The type of entrepreneurial failure imagined by Lazonick would have shown up
in the data as new entrants adopting faster than the incumbents.35 They did not. Only 24 percent
of the rms that had adopted rings by 1910 were new rms.
Column 4 of Table 5 reinforces this observation by showing that most of the new rms were
spinner-only rms. This observation is particularly striking when coupled with another one, which
is underscored in Column 5 of Table 5: almost no rm changed its organizational form (e.g. from
being a spinner-only to being a vertically integrated rm or viceversa) upon the adoption of ring
spinning. Moreover, we can use the information in Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c to see that out of the
seven rms that changed organizational form, only Rostron in Rochdale and Hindle in Blackburn
vertically integrated their weaving and spinning upon the adoption of ring spinning. The other ve
vertically de-integrated their operations.
Finally, we can use Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c to look at the number of ring spindles installed in
order to learn about the distribution of the number of ring spindles installed. The idea here is the
following: if it had been the case that ring spindles were installed in new mills or in extensions of
old mills, then we would expect rms to install a large number of spindles. If, instead, rings were
being slowly adopted to replace retired mules, then we would observe much more variation in the
number of spindles. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the number of ring spindles installed in
1910.36 It is clear that there was a very large number of small installations (one quarter of them
35His claim that ring-frames were installed in extensions of old mills would be extremely hard to test because
one would have to collect information on the size of each rms mills. It is not even clear how Lazonick can make
that statement in the rst place, since he did not employ the rm-level information in the Worralls Directories in
conjunction with some other data source with information on the size of the mills, such as the Ordnenance Surveys.
36To draw this graph I only use rms for which we denitively know the number of ring spindles installed between
1902 and 1910. Fewer than 10 percent (20 out of 221) of the rms that reported that they had installed rings in 1910
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was for fewer than 8200 spindles), which is hard to reconcile with the idea that they were adopted
by new rms, and it instead suggests that rms were slowly replacing the old mules with new ring
spindles.
4.3 The Adoption of Rings for Weft Yarn: Integrated versus Non-integrated
Firms
The last of Lazonicks arguments is that the costs of shipping ring weft yarn were enormously larger
for a non-integrated rm than for an integrated rm. This made vertical integration even more
economically e¢ cient than specialization. To support this hypothesis, Lazonick claimed that prior
to World War I ring frames were rarely used for spinning weft yarns in non-integrated mills.37
Earlier writers have assumed that vertically integrated rms produced both twist and weft
yarn. This was not necessarily true, as shown in Table 6. The top panel of Table 6 shows the
distribution of rms in the production of weft and yarn. We observe that both in 1890 and 1910,
approximately 70 percent of the vertically integrated rms were spinning both weft and twist yarn.
The remaining vertically integrated rms had to buy either weft or twist to weave their cloth. These
rms were buying weft yarn on the market. For example, the rms Thornber in Burnley, Nuttal
in Farnsworth, Barker in Todmorden, and others had adopted rings to produce twist yarn. They
were buying the weft yarn for their weaving production (or they were selling their surplus of twist
yarn on the market). As already noted, not many of the vertically integrated rms were buying
weft yarn (or selling twist yarn), but it is notable that few of these ones had actually adopted
rings. This surprising result is even stronger for spinner-only rms. Only around 60 percent of
did not provide the exact number of ring spindles that they had installed.
37Lazonick [1981], page 98.
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them were spinning both twist and yarn. What is particularly cogent for the analysis here is that
the percentages did not change between 1890 and 1910. This necessarily implies that vertically
integrated rms did not feel that is was necessary to produce both weft and twist in order to avoid
the presumed cost of shipping ring weft yarn.
The middle panel reports the results using spindleage capacity rather than the number of rms.
Here, the results are less dramatic. In 1890 and 1910, approximately 90 percent of the spindling
capacity of vertically integrated rms was in rms that were spinning both weft and twist yarn.
The results in the top and middle panel imply that large integrated rms generally produced both
types of yarn. Some small vertically integrated rms produced only one of the two.
The bottom panel reports the distribution of the spindling capacity by the neness of the
cloth woven and by whether twist and weft spinning was done together. We observe that the
percentages in this bottom panel basically follow the ones in the middle panel. For example, in
1890, 85:4 percent of the total spindleage capacity of the vertically integrated rms was used in
the production of coarse goods (count 0   40) by rms that were spinning both twist and weft.
70 percent of the total spindleage capacity of the spinner-only rms was used in the production of
coarse goods (count 0   40) by rms that were spinning both twist and weft. These percentages
were largely unchanged in 1910.
There are two key insights from Table 6. First, vertically integrated rms that were only
spinning twist or weft yarn were still in existence in 1910. If the costs of shipping ring weft yarn
were, in practice, as large as calculated by Lazonick and Leunig, then this sub-type of vertically
integrated rms should have declined over time, but it did not. Second, the shares of spindleage
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capacity and the number of rms that were vertically integrated and spinner-only rms did not
change over time. If vertical integration was really the more e¢ cient way to organize cotton
production, we would have observed a decline in the number and spindleage capacity of spinner-
only rms, but that did not happen.
4.4 Producing Finer Goods
To conclude this section on a positive note, I now use the new rm-level data to provide additional
evidence in favor of Leunigs explanation for Lancashires continuing preference for the mule: the
strong demand for ne yarn and the sizeable yarn-export trade.
Table 7 shows that distribution of the spindleage capacity by cloth neness and by the orga-
nization of the rms. In 1890, 75:6 percent of the spindleage capacity of the vertically integrated
rms was for the production of coarse goods (counts between 0 and 40).38 Among the spinner-only
rms, 53:4 percent of the spindleage capacity was for the production of coarse goods.
The striking piece of evidence is that between 1890 and 1910 there was a dramatic decline in the
percentage of spindleage dedicated to the production of coarse goods. In 1910, only 36:8 percent
of the spindleage capacity of the spinner-only rms was used to produce coarse goods, down from
53:4 percent. Similarly, 64:9 percent of the spindleage capacity of the vertically integrated rms
was used to produce coarse goods, down from 75:6 percent.
Table 7 provides evidence of a highly specialized industry. Spinner-only rms specialized in the
production of ne goods, while vertically integrated rms specialized in the production of coarse
goods. Because the spindleage capacity of spinner-only rms was twice as large as that of vertically
38This number is remarkably close to the one reported by Leunig [2001].
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integrated rms, and because ring-spinning was not the most e¢ cient way to produce ne goods,
this largely explains why rings were adopted so slowly in Britain at the end of the 18th century.
5 Why Did Vertically Integrated Adopted Rings So Late?
A striking and novel nding is that vertically integrated rms had essentially not adopted any
ring-spinning until 1902, and then suddenly they started adopting the rings at a faster pace than
spinning-only rms. This is clear when we look at Table 5. Until 1902, the large majority (87 out
of 109, approximately 80 percent) of the rms adopting rings were spinner-only rms. By 1910,
the percentage of rms that were spinner-only was down to 59 percent (197 out of 330). Why did
vertically integrated rms suddenly start adopting rings?
One very compelling explanation is related to the timing of the introduction of the Northrop
automatic loom in Britain. As Sandberg [1974] discusses, the Northrop loom was rst introduced
in 1902, and in 1904 the British Northrop Loom Company was established. The Northrop loom was
not suited for ne goods, which, as we saw, were mainly produced by spinner-only rms. However,
the Northrop loom was particularly e¢ cient at the production of coarse goods, which was the
segment of the market mostly covered by vertically integrated rms. Thus, vertically integrated
rms should have been adopting the new automatic loom, but, as Sandberg reports, they did it at
a dramatically slow rate. Remarkably, in Worralls Directory of 1910 there is one new vertically
integrated rm, Eccles Spinning & Manufacturing Co, formed in 1905 and located in Patricroft,
Manchester, which simultaneously adopted rings and Northrop looms.
The crucial insight here is that automatic looms required the greater strength of ring-spun as
opposed to mule-spun yarn (Sandberg [1974]). As Sandberg explains, the complementarity between
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ring-spinning and automatic weaving meant that plans to install automatic looms depended on the
availability of ring-spinning.
Vertically integrated rms, which mainly produced coarse goods and whose survival was clearly
at stake against foreign competitors, must have realized that they had to adopt rings in order
to exploit the advantages of the automatic looms. This intepretation explains the sudden and
dramatic increase in the rate of adoption of rings after 1902.39
6 Conclusion
This paper uses rm-level data to show that entrepreneurial failure does not explain the decline of
the Lancashire cotton industry before World War I, at least as long as the test for entrepreneurial
failure is based on di¤erences in the adoption of rings between vertically integrated and non-
integrated rms.
This paper shows that the Lancashire cotton industry was highly specialized, with vertically
integrated rms producing primarily coarse goods and spinner-only rms producing primarily yarn
for ne goods. This, together with the fact that the spindleage capacity of spinning-only rms was
twice as large as that of vertically integrated rms and the strong demand for ne yarn and the
sizeable yarn-export trade, explains Lancashires continuing preference for the mule.
This paper also uncovers a new important nding: vertically integrated rms had essentially
not adopted any ring-spinning till 1902, and then suddenly they started adopting the rings at a
faster pace than only-spinning rms. Though more research is warranted to explain this nding,
39To support this explanation, one could check the cotton company reports or trade journals and verify whether
the sudden change in the behavior of vertically integrated rms was driven by the awareness that only with both
automatic looms and ring-spinning could the producers of coarse goods have survived the international competition.
This is left to future research.
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here I propose an explanation based on the complementarity between ring-spinning and automatic
weaving. Vertically integrated rms had to adopt ring-spinning before adopting the automatic
looms. This intuitive explanation elucidates why rings were adopted so late by vertically integrated
rms, and why automatic looms were adopted so slowly by British entrepreneurs.
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7 Appendix
The data are from the Worralls Cotton Spinnersand ManufacturersDirectories of 1885, 1886-7,
1890, 1893-4, 1902 and 1910. These data contain information on the names of the rms, locations,
and types of spindles used by cotton rms in Lancashire. They also contain information on the
number of spindles (and looms) used by each rm, the neness of the product manufactured, and
whether the rm spun twist, weft, or both. Farnie [1979] discusses the reliability of the Worralls
Directories.
This Appendix discusses three data coding choices.
Firms and Mills. In a few cases mills changed ownership across the years. In those cases, with
one exception (Meanock Ellis in Mossley, discussed below) I used the mill as the relevant unit of
observation. For example, if the rm Tay in Oldham acquired a mill that was already in existence
and placed rings in that pre-existing mill, then I coded the rm Tay as an incumbent and not as
a new entrant adopting rings. A di¤erent coding choice would have only a marginal e¤ect on the
results of this paper, because few mills changed ownership and adopted rings at the same time. In
1902 there were 7 rms out of 51, or 13 percent of the rms, which t this description. There were
only a handful in 1910, by which time more than 200 rms had adopted rings.
Potential for Misreporting. Firms are listed in Table 4a, 4b, and 4c as having adopted rings
when they rst reported rings in the Worralls Directories. This is not an obvious data coding
decision because in some cases there is reason to believe that rms might have adopted rings before
the listed year. For example, the rm Palm Mill in Oldham reported 40; 000 ring spindles in 1887
and 40; 000 (type not specied) spindles in 1885. One might be tempted to infer that the rm
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Palm Mill had adopted rings already in 1885. In this paper I have decided not to make this type
of assumptions and instead I have coded the data exactly as it is in the Worralls directories. To
get a sense of the possible misreprentation problem, I identied 47 rms out of the 330 (i.e. 13
percent of the sample) that had adopted rings by 1910 and for which one could possibly argue that
the rms had adopted rings earlier than what is reported in the Worralls directories.
These rms are Walker in Hyde, Victoria in Manchester, Lees H. in Oldham, Arkwright in
Rochdale, Healey in Rochdale, Glodwick in Oldham, Lees in Oldham, Mutual in Heywood, Roach
in Heywood, Irk Mill in Middleton, Wood T. B. in Middleton, Stott James in Oldham, Park Lane
in Preston, Halliday in Wigan, Dyson Eli in Farnsworth, Hodgkinsons in Heywood, Isherwood
in Heywood, Railway in Heywood, Roe Acre in Heywood, Storey in Lancaster, Broadbent in
Manchester, Richardson in Manchester, Millbrook in Stalybridge, Staley in Stalybridge, Shepherd
R. in Waterfoot, Witham in Burnley, Bury & Elt. in Bury, Holdsworth in Manchester, Clegg
in Oldham, Tattersall in Rochdale, Heginbottom in Ashton, Thompson Richard in Blackburn,
Trafalgar in Burnley, Bury Coop in Bury, Wood in Glossop, Sefton Mill in Heywood, Burton in
Leigh, Armitage in Manchester, Rylands in Manchester, Eccles T. in Preston, Broadley in Rochdale,
Harrison in Stalybridge, Pearson in Stockport, Barker W. in Todmorden, Fielden in Todmorden,
and Eckersleys in Wigan.
The only rms for which I use an imputation methodology are Haugh in Rochdale and Meanock
Ellis in Mossley, which I list as new entrants in 1887, even though they were already in the market
in 1885. The point here is that both Haugh in Rochdale and Meanock Ellis in Mossley entered into
the market when they installed rings, so for the purposes of my analysis (Table 4.a) they should
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really be considered as new entrants. Notice that Meanock Ellis used a pre-existing mill, but I still
consider it as a new entrant. It is the only case in the dataset for which I make this choice.
Of these 47 rms, 26 (i.e. 54 percent) were spinner-only. Because the fraction of rms potentially
misreporting is small (approximately 10 percent), and because both spinner-only and vertically
integrated rms are included in this group, there is no reason to think that misreporting should
bias the results of the analysis against vertically integrated rms.
Inconsistencies in the Worralls Directories. For 1902 and 1910 the Worralls Directories
provide information on the count of the yarn spun by the rms and on the type of spindle used 
whether ring, water, or mule in two locations. First, as part of the complete rm listing, together
with the information on the number of spindles and the names of the mills owned. Second, at the
end of the Directories, where there is an alphabetical list of the rms in Lancashire. These two
sources of information are not always consistent with each other. Here, I take the superset of the
two sets of information. In other words, if a rm is reported to having adopted rings in either one
of the locations then I code the rm as having adopted rings.
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Table 1: Fineness
1 12 2 23 3
Twist 0-20 Twist in 10s Twist 20-40 Twist 20-40 Twist >40
Weft 0-30 Weft in 20s Weft 20-40 Weft in 40s Weft >50
Alhambra Chasmeres Calico Dhooties Cambrics
Beaverteens Colored Goods Check, Nainsook Jacconettes Check, Dimity
Cords Cotton Italians Covers Lenos Check, Lawn
Crapes Domestics Dobbies Mulls Dimities
Denim Florentines Flanellettes Sateen Fancy White Goods
Drill Grandrills Fustians Turkey Reds Gingham, Fine
Flannel Mottles Gingham Velvet Silk Velvets
Honeycomb towels Nankeens Gingham, Chambray Velveteen
Huckaback Regattas Handkerchief
Imperials Satin Tops Harvards & Oxfords
Lambskins Stripe India & China Shirtings
Mexicans T Cloths Jeannettes
Osnaburg Ticks Long Cloth
Sheeting Twills Madapollams
Sheeting, Heavy Worsted Cords Muslins
Swansdowns Zephyrs Pique
Towels Printers
Turkish towels Prints
Wigan Quilts, Plain and Fancy
Sheeting, Bleached
Sheeting, Wide
Shirting
Split
Tanjibs
Toilet
Zephyrs
Source: Worrall’s Directories of Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers, 1885, 1886-7, 1890, 1893-4, 1902, 1910.
Notes: This classification is constructed using the products that the firms claimed to be manufacturing. This approach
ensures that the classification is internally consistent with the data on spindles and mules reported in the directories.
Table 2: Spinning Capacity in Lancashire 
 
Total Number of 
Spindles(%) 
 
Spinners 
Only 
 
Vertically Integrated 
Firms 
1890 64.4 35.6 
1902 71.0 29.0 
1910 78.8 21.2 
Number of Firms by Type 
1890 (%) 557 (62.2) 350 (37.8) 
1902 (%) 556 (64.9) 300 (35.0) 
1910 (%) 683 (70.7) 283  (29.3) 
Data: Worrall’s Directory of Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers, 1890, 1902, 1910. 
The reported numbers of observations does not include firms for which we have missing information.  
 
Table 3: The Best Practice Choice of Technique 
  
Twist 
 
 
Weft 
Not including Transportation Costs 
(Vertically Integrated Firm) 
0-40 (R) 
40+ (M) 
0-40 (R) 
40+ (M) 
Including Transportation Costs 
(Non-Integrated Firm) 
0-40 (R) 
40+ (M) 
(M) 
Sources: Leunig Myth, Table 24, p. 66, is used to compute the labor and raw cotton costs. Lazonick “Factor 
Spinning,” Table II, p. 101, is used to compute the transportation costs. For example, Leunig reports that 
the net savings from the adoption of ring spinning were equal to 0.11 cents per pound: ring spinning would 
have saved 0.41 cents in labor costs but would have increased by 0.30 the raw cotton costs. Lazonick 
computes the additional transportation costs for weft to be equal to 0.54 cents per pound. 
Note: The capital letter in parenthesis denotes the best practice. For example, rings were the best technique 
for counts 0/40 in vertically integrated firms. 
Name of the Firm District Type in 1885 Type in 1887 Spindles in 1887
Bury Cott Bury VI VI [50000]
Heywood Heywood S S 19296
Meanock Mossley 0 S [16500]
Palm Mill Oldham S S 40000
Castleton Rochdale S S 26000
Haugh Rochdale 0 S 25300
New Lady Rochdale S S 16016
Newhey Rochdale 0 S 35200
Lees Warrington S S [20000]
Type in 1887 1890 Spindles in 1890
Tottington Bury VI S 11000
Taylor Denton S S 1800
Shepley Glossop VI VI 5420
Smithson Golborne S S 2400
Walker Hyde S S [40900]
Pendleton Manchester W S 12000
Victoria Manchester S S [44500]
Cambridge Oldham S S 4736
Clough Oldham S S 1184
Greenacres Oldham S S [114034]
Lees H. Oldham S S 8000
Textile Mill Oldham S S [95520]
Allen Bros. Radcliffe VI S 10000
Arkwright Rochdale S S 23000
Healey Rochdale S S 9800
Walker J&G Rochdale S S 36000
Type in 1890 Type in 1894 Spindles in 1894
Bayley Bolton S S [100360]
Holdsworth Bolton S S [47000]
Wolfenden Bolton S S [57000]
Witham Burnley VI VI [48504]
Alcock Bury VI VI 2316
Bury & Elt. Bury VI VI [50000]
Vulcan Bury 0 VI 40000
Alpha Mill Denton S S [57000]
Burns Heywood 0 S 43000
Kay Richard Heywood S S 25000
Taylor James Heywood S S 7000
Hibbert Hyde VI VI 1480
Garlick & Dyson Manchester S S [30000]
Hanover Mill Manchester S S 17000
Holdsworth Manchester VI VI 26000
Johnson Manchester S S 10000
Middleton & T. Middleton S S 9024
Busk Oldham 0 S 6400
Clegg Oldham VI VI 75326
Glodwick Oldham S S 79968
Holden Oldham S S [8180]
Lees Oldham S S [75000]
Seville S&E Oldham S S 1648
Stock Lane Oldham S S 10000
Park Lane Preston S S [50000]
Rostron Radcliffe W VI 16000
Balderstone Rochdale S S 17000
Eagle Rochdale 0 S [89000]
Tattersall Rochdale VI VI [15000]
Yates Rochdale VI VI 8000
Jackson & S. Stalybridge 0 VI 4000
Uppermill Uppermill S S 10280
May Mill Wigan 0 S 21600
Source: Worrall’s Directory of Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers 1885, 1886-7, 1890, 1893-4.
Notes: 
(1) If the firm was a spinner-only, then it is coded with S; weaver-only are coded with W; vertically integrated firms are coded with VI.
(2) If the firm is a new entrant, then a 0 is reported for the preceding period.
(3) If the firm reports the number of spindles, but does not say how many of them are rings, then the number of spindles is reported in brackets.
Table 4a - Adoption Patterns in 1887, 1890 and 1894
Name of the Firm District Type in 1894 Type in 1902 Spindles in 1902
Imperial Mill Blackburn 0 S 67000
Brookfield Bolton S S [25000]
Lord Bolton S S [85640]
Moorlands Bolton 0 S [32340]
Park Mill Bolton S S [102882]
Thornber Burnley VI VI 43000
Higher Mill Bury S S 6400
Century Farnsworth 0 S 51000
Nuttall Farnsworth VI VI [87500]
Record Golborne 0 S 31190
Brook Heywood S S [26000]
Healey Heywood 0 S 8500
Mutual Heywood S S [160000]
Roach Heywood S S [43000]
Christy W. M. Manchester VI VI [21000]
Pendlebury Manchester S S 31200
Taylor Manchester S S 2276
Irk Mill Middleton S S [40000]
Tonge Vale Middleton S S 6808
Wood T. B. Middleton S S 20000
Egmont Mossley 0 S 7000
Booth Oldham S S 1300
County End Oldham S S 2304
Dawn Mill Oldham 0 S 8000
King Spinn. Oldham 0 S 17880
Lamb Mills Oldham 0 S 10000
Nile Oldham 0 S 64000
Oldham Oldham S S [88512]
Oxford Mill Oldham S S [40000]
Pearl Mill Oldham S S 6228
Stott James Oldham S S 25000
Tay Oldham S S [28200]
Taylor James Oldham S S 4432
Taylor Thomas Oldham S S 3840
Catterall P. Preston S S [39536]
Park Lane Preston S S [50000]
Era Mill Co. Rochdale 0 S 59600
Holt & O. Rochdale S S 14000
Union Ring Rochdale W S 40000
Cheetam Stalybridge VI VI 16000
Leech Stalybridge VI VI 4800
Nuttal Stalybridge S S 20000
Stalybridge Stalybridge S S 1920
Brunswick Stockport S S 10000
Lowe Stockport VI VI 9000
Moorhouse Stockport S S 30700
Stockport Stockport 0 S 64456
Barker Todmorden VI VI 7500
Greenwood Todmorden S S 7020
Eccles Uppermill 0 S [35000]
Halliday Wigan S S 10000
Source: Worrall’s Directory of Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers 1893-4, 1902.
Notes: 
(1) If the firm was a spinner-only, then it is coded with S; weaver-only are coded with W; vertically integrated firms are coded with VI.
(2) If the firm is a new entrant, then a 0 is reported for the preceding period.
(3) If the firm reports the number of spindles, but does not say how many of them are rings, then the number of spindles is reported in brackets .
Table 4b - Adoption Patterns in 1902
Name of District Type in 1910 Name of District Type in 1910 Name of District Type in 1910 Name of District Type in 1910 
Firm (Type in 1902) Firm (Type in 1902) Firm (Type in 1902) Firm (Type in 1902)
Canal Mills Accrington VI Broad Mills Glossop VI United Oldham S Goyt Stockport S*
Roe Greave Accrington VI Gartside Glossop VI Wood J. Oldham S Hollins Stockport VI
Stanhill Accrington S* Platt Glossop VI Ingham W. Padiham VI Hollins, Marple Stockport VI
Gartside Ashton VI Rhodes Glossop VI Calvert I Preston VI Howard Stockport S
Heginbottom Ashton VI Sumner Glossop VI Calvert II Preston VI Kershaw Stockport VI
Hurst Mills Ashton VI Wood Glossop VI Copland Preston S Kingston Stockport S
Kershaw James Ashton S Thompson Great Harwood VI Dewhurst Preston VI Mellor Stockport S
Mason Thomas Ashton S Hazel Mill Haslingden S Eccles Brot. Preston VI Palmer Stockport S
Mellor Thomas Ashton VI Albert Heywood S Eccles T. Preston VI Pearson Stockport VI
Reyner Ashton VI Hodgkinsons Heywood S Eccles W. Preston VI Shepley Stockport VI
Whittakers Ashton VI Hopwood Heywood S Hartford Preston VI Stockport 2 Stockport S*
Coddington Blackburn VI Isherwood Heywood S Hawkins Preston VI Stockport 3 Stockport S*
Codling & H. Blackburn VI Park Street Heywood S Leigh Preston VI Vernon Stockport S*
Daisyfield Ring Blackburn S* Railway Heywood S Orr Preston VI Warks Stockport VI
Dugdale Thomas Blackburn VI Roe Acre Heywood S Oxhey Preston VI Barker W. Todmorden VI
Fish John Blackburn VI Sefton Mill Heywood VI Paley Preston VI* Dugdale Todmorden VI
Hindle E. & G. Blackburn VI(W) Unity Heywood S* Preston Preston VI Fielden Todmorden VI
Hollin Bank Ring Blackburn S* Ashton Hyde VI Preston Tulketh S* Sutcliffe Todmorden S*
Lewis Brothers Blackburn VI Slack Mills Hyde VI Black Lane Radcliffe S* Vic Mill Uppermill S*
Longwoth Blackburn VI Storey Lancaster S Radcliffe Radcliffe S Pickup Waterfoot VI
Mellor Blackburn S* Jones Leigh VI Wilton Radcliffe S* Shepherd Waterfoot S
Rishton Blackburn VI Burton Leigh VI Cuba Ramsbottom S* Shepherd R. Waterfoot S
Thompson Blackburn VI Clegg E. Littleborough VI Ashworth Rawtenstall VI Whitewell Waterfoot VI
Whiteley Blackburn VI Schofield J.K. Littleborough VI Haworth Rawtenstall VI White Waterfoot VI
Ainsworth Bolton S Sladen Littleborough VI Newchurch Rawtenstall VI Brown Wigan VI
Brown Bolton S Acme Manchester S* Rawtenstall Rawtenstall VI Crescent Wigan S*
Crosses Bolton S Armitage Manchester VI Globe Rawtenstall VI Eckersleys Wigan VI
Greenhalgh Bolton S Armitage 2 Manchester VI Blackpits Rochdale VI Empress Wigan S*
Hamer Bolton S Ashworth Manchester S Bridgefield Rochdale S* Woods Wigan S(VI)
Hesketh Bolton S Barlein Manchester S Brierley Rochdale VI
Maco Bolton S* Bannerman Manchester S Bright Rochdale VI
Marsden Bolton S Broadbent 1 Manchester S Broadley Rochdale VI
North End Bolton S Broadbent 2 Manchester S Coral Mill Rochdale S*
Tootal Bolton VI Eccles Manchester VI* Crest Ring Rochdale S*
Folds Burnley VI Ermen & R. Manchester S Dale Rochdale S*
Hill Top Burnley VI Gladstone Manchester S Dicken Rochdale S*
Oxford Burnley VI Langworthy Manchester VI Eastwood Rochdale S*
Trafalgar Burnley VI Regent Mill Manchester S* Facit Rochdale S*
Bury Coop Bury VI Richardson Manchester S Hamer Rochdale S
Bury & H. Bury VI Rylands Manchester VI Hargreaves Rochdale VI
Hutchinson Bury VI Togo Spin. Manchester S* Higham Rochdale VI
Kenyon Bury VI* Cromer Middleton S* Hoyle Rochdale VI
Kenyon Bury VI Soudan Middleton S* Millgate Rochdale VI
Mellor Bury VI Clark & W. Mossley S* Orr J&S Rochdale VI
New Victoria Bury VI Hopkins Mossley S* Parker & H. Rochdale S
Openshaw Bury VI Mossley Mossley S* Rochdale Rochdale VI
Openshaw W. Bury VI Belgrave Oldham S* Shawforth Rochdale VI
Pilot Bury S* Briar Mill Oldham S* Sparth Rochdale S
Schofield Bury VI Butterworth Oldham VI Stuttard Rochdale VI
Walker & L. Bury S Clegg Broth. Oldham S Townhead Rochdale S
Birtwistle Chorley VI Copster Mill Oldham S* Valley Rochdale S*
Coppull Chorley S* Fitton Oldham VI Victoria Rochdale S
Cowling Chorley S* Fox Mills Oldham S* Wellfield Rochdale S*
Nixon & K. Chorley VI Iris Mill Oldham S* Whitaker Rochdale S
Talbot Chorley VI* Lees Union Oldham S Whitworth Rochdale VI
Garnett Clitheroe VI Lily Mill Oldham S* Byrom Stalybridge S
Mercer Clitheroe VI Majestic Oldham S* Harrison Stalybridge VI
Primrose Clitheroe S* Napier Oldham S* Millbrook Stalybridge S
Darwen Darwen VI Orme Oldham S* Premier Stalybridge VI*
Eccles A.T. Darwen VI Raven Oldham S* Ray Mills Stalybridge S*
Gibraltar Denton VI Richardson Oldham S Staley Stalybridge S
Dukinfield Dukinfield S Roy Mill Oldham S* Storrs Stalybridge S*
Barnes Farnsworth VI Royton Oldham S* Victor Stalybridge S*
Dyson Eli Farnsworth S Shaw Spinn. Oldham S Wilkinson Stalybridge S
Source: Worrall’s Directory of Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers 1902, 1910.
Notes: 
(1) If the firm was a spinner-only, then it is coded with S; weaver-only are coded with W; vertically integrated firms are coded with VI.
(2) If the firm is a new entrant, then a * is reported in addition to the type of firm.
Table 4c - Adoption Patterns in 1910
Table 5: Ring Adoption in Lancashire, 1887-1910 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year Total Number of 
Firms 
Number of Only-Spinners at time 
of adoption  
 
New 
Firms 
 
New Firms 
Only-
Spinners 
 
Incumbent Firms Changing 
Organizational Form 
 
1887 9 8 3 3 0 
1890 25 23 3 3 3 
1894 58 42 9 8 4 
1902 109 87 21 20 5 
1910 330 197 80 74 7 
Source: Worrall’s Directories of Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers, 1885, 1886-7, 1890, 1893-4, 1902, 1910. 
Notes: The numbers reported in all the Columns of the Table are cumulative. For example 25 firms had adopted rings by 1890. 
Table 6: Twist and Weft Yarn in Lancashire, 1890 
  
Spinners 
Only 
 
Vertically Integrated 
Firms 
 
 
Total 
 
Percentage of firms 
Only Twist in 1890 (%) 27.7 8.3 20.6 
Only Weft in 1890 (%) 14.8 20.2 16.7 
Twist and Weft in 1890 
(%) 
57.5 71.6 62.7 
Only Twist in 1910 (%) 225 9.0 18.5 
Only Weft in 1910 (%) 12.1 19.9 67.1 
Twist and Weft in 1910 
(%) 
65.4 71.1 14.3 
Percentage of spindleage capacity 
Only Twist in 1890 (%) 22.3 6.7 17.2 
Only Weft in 1890 (%) 8.4 8.9 8.6 
Twist and Weft in 1890 
(%) 
69.3 88.4 74.2 
Only Twist in 1910 (%) 14.5 5.5 12.8 
Only Weft in 1910 (%) 8.0 6.0 7.6 
Twist and Weft in 1910 
(%) 
77.5 88.5 79.6 
Percentage of spindleage capacity for counts 0-40 
Only Twist in 1890 (%) 22.8 8.4 16.9 
Only Weft in 1890 (%) 6.6 6.2 6.5 
Twist and Weft in 1890 
(%) 
70.5 85.4 76.6 
Only Twist in 1910 (%) 21.9 6.7 17.2 
Only Weft in 1910 (%) 6.8 5.9 6.5 
Twist and Weft in 1910 
(%) 
71.3 87.4 76.3 
Data: Worrall’s Directory of Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers, 1890, 1910. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Spinning Capacity and Fineness in Lancashire 
  
Spinners 
Only 
 
Vertically Integrated 
Firms 
Total 
    
Count 0-40 in 1890 (%) 53.4 75.6 61.1 
Count above 40 in 1890 (%) 46.6 24.4 38.9 
Count 0-40 in1902 (%) 50.7 67.8 55.6 
Count above 40 in 1902 (%) 49.3 32.2 44.3 
Count 0-40 in 1910 (%) 36.8 64.9 41.5 
Count above 40 in 1910 (%) 62.9 35.1 58.4 
   
Number of Firms by Type 
N 1890 (%) 557 (62.2) 350 (37.8) 907 
N 1902 (%) 556 (64.9) 300 (35.0) 856 
N 1910 (%) 683 (70.7) 283  (29.3) 966 
Data: Worrall’s Directory of Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers, 1890, 1902, 1910. 
 
 
Figure 1: Location of Cotton Mills in Blackburn, 1890-1893.
Source: Ordnance Survey Map of Blackburn, 1891-92, Great Britain.
Legend: W= Weaver; S=Spinner; I=Integrated firm. w=producing only weft yarn; t=producing only twist year; tw=producing both weft and twist yarn.
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Figure 2: Location of Cotton Mills in Preston, 1890-1893.
Source: Ordnance Survey Map of Preston, 1891-92, Great Britain.
Legend: W= Weaver; S=Spinner; I=Integrated firm. w=producing only weft yarn;
 t=producing only twist year; tw=producing both weft and twist yarn.
Moor Park 
Mill (W)
Brookfield Mill (I,w)
Brookfield Mill (I,w)
Southgate Mill (I,tw)
Kent Street 
Mill (W)
Hanover Street 
Mill (W)
Park Mill (S, tw)
Park Mill Shed (W)
Bushell Street Mill (W)
Lawson 
Mill (W)
0
10
20
30
40
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
600 20000 50000 100000 230000
Newly Installed Ring Spindles in 1910
Source: Worrall’s Directory of Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers, 1902, 1910.
Figure 3: Distribution of Newly Installed Ring Spindles, 1910
